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Abstract We continue the study of the effects of selfish behavior in the network
design problem. We provide new bounds for the price of stability for network design
with fair cost allocation for undirected graphs. We consider the most general case,
for which the best known upper bound is the Harmonic number Hn , where n is the
number of agents, and the best previously known lower bound is 12/7 ≈ 1.778.
We present a nontrivial lower bound of 42/23 ≈ 1.8261. Furthermore, we show
that for two players, the price of stability is exactly 4/3, while for three players it is at
least 74/48 ≈ 1.542 and at most 1.65. These are the first improvements on the bound
of Hn for general networks. In particular, this demonstrates a separation between the
price of stability on undirected graphs and that on directed graphs, where Hn is tight.
Previously, such a gap was only known for the cases where all players have a shared
source, and for weighted players.
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1 Introduction
The effects of selfish behavior in networks is a natural problem with long-standing
and wide-spread practical relevance. As such, a wide variety of network design and
connection games have received attention in the algorithmic game theory literature
(for a survey, see [17]).
One natural question is how much the users’ selfish behavior affects the performance of the system. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [10, 14] addressed this question
using a worst-case measure, namely the Price of Anarchy (PoA). This notion compares the cost of the worst-case Nash equilibrium to that of the social optimum (the
best that could be obtained by central coordination). From an optimistic point of
view, Anshelevich et al. [2] proposed the Price of Stability (PoS), the ratio of the
lowest Nash equilibrium cost to the social cost, as a measure of the minimal effect of
selfishness.
There has been substantial work on the PoA for congestion games, a broad class
of games with interesting properties originally introduced by Rosenthal [15]. Congestion games nicely model situations that arise in selfish routing, resource allocation and
network design problems, and the PoA for these games is now quite well-understood
[16, 7, 6, 3]. By comparison, much less work has been done on the PoS: The PoS
for network design games has been studied by [2, 5, 1, 9, 11], while the PoS for
routing games1 was studied by [2, 6, 4]. However, PoA techniques cannot easily be
transferred to the study of PoS. New techniques thus need to be developed; this work
moves toward this direction.
The particular network design problem we address here is the one which was initially studied by Anshelevich et al. [2], sometimes referred to as the fair cost sharing
network design (or creation) game. In it, each player has a set of endpoints in a network that he must connect; to achieve this, he must choose a subset of the links in the
network to utilize. Each link has a cost associated with it, and if more than one player
wishes to utilize the same link, the cost of that link is split evenly among the players.
Each player’s goal is to pay as little as possible to connect his endpoints. The global
social objective is to connect all player’s endpoints as cheaply as possible.
Anshelevich et al. [2] showed that if G is a directed graph, the price of anarchy
is equal to n, the number of players, whereas the price of stability is exactly the nth
harmonic number Hn . The upper bound is proven by using the fact that our network
design game, and in fact any congestion game, is a potential game. A potential game,
first defined by Monderer and Shapley [12], is a game where the change to a player’s
payoff due to a deviation from a game solution can be reflected in a potential function,
or a function that maps game states to real numbers.
This upper bound of Hn holds even in the case of undirected graphs (since the
potential function of the game does not change when the underlying graph is undirected), however the lower bound does not. Hence the central open question we study
is:
1 Both cost-sharing network design games and network routing games fall in the class of congestion
games and they differ only in the edge cost functions. Cost sharing network design games come together
with decreasing cost functions on the edges, e.g. ce (x) = ce /x, while routing games come with increasing
latency functions, e.g. ce (x) = ce ⋅ x.
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What is the price of stability in the fair cost sharing network design game on
undirected graphs?
In the case of two players and a single common sink vertex, Anshelevich et al. [2]
show that the answer is 4/3. Some further progress has also more recently been
made toward answering this question. Fiat et al. [9] showed that in the case where
there is a single common sink vertex and every other vertex is a source vertex, the
price of stability is O(log log n). They also give an n-player lower bound instance of
12/7 [13]. For the more general case where the agents share a sink but not every
vertex is a source vertex, Li [11] showed an upper bound of O(log n/ loglog n). Chen
and Roughgarden [5] studied the price of stability for the weighted variant of the
game, where each player pays a fraction of each edge cost proportional to her weight.
Albers [1] showed that in this variant, the price of stability is Ω (logW / log logW ),
where W is the sum of the players’ weights.
Our contributions We show for the first time that the price of stability in undirected networks is definitively different from the one for directed networks in the
general case (where all players may have distinct source and destination vertices).
In particular, we show that PoS is exactly 4/3 for two agents (strictly less than
PoS in the directed case, which is H2 = 3/2), while for three agents it is at least
74/48 ≈ 1.542 and at most 1.65 (again strictly less than PoS in the directed case,
which is H3 = 11/6). Furthermore, we show that the price of stability for general n is
at least 42/23 > 1.8261, improving upon the previous bound due to Fiat et al. [9].
1.1 The model
We are given an underlying network, G = (V, E), where V is the set of vertices and
E is the set of edges in the network. Each player i = 1 . . . n has a set of two nodes
(endpoints) si ,ti ∈ V to connect. We refer to si as the source endpoint of player i and ti
as the destination or sink endpoint of player i. The strategy set of each player i consists
of all sets of edges Si ⊆ E such that Si connects all the vertices in Ti . There is a cost ce
associated with each edge e ∈ E. The cost to player i of a solution S = (S1 , S2 , . . . , Sn )
is Ci (S) = ∑e∈Si ce /ne where ne is the number of players in S who chose a strategy that
contains e. Each player i wants to minimize Ci (S). The global objective is minimize
∑ni=1 Ci (S).
2 A Lower Bound of 1.826
Consider a 3 by N grid for some large N. There are three nodes and two horizontal
edges in every row. The levels are numbered starting from the bottom. We denote the
horizontal edges on level i by Li and Ri (from left to right). The nodes on level i are
denoted by vi j ( j = 1, 2, 3) and the vertical edges connecting level i to level i + 1 are
denoted by ei j ( j = 1, 2, 3). Each node vi j for i = 1, . . . , N − 1 and j = 1, 2, 3 is the
source of some agent pi, j , who has node vi+1, j as its sink. We say that player pi, j
starts at level i. Also we will call player pi, j the owner of edge ei, j , with pi, j owning
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Fig. 1 On the left are two levels in our construction. The situation on the right is not a Nash equilibrium
because of the added ε ’s on the horizontal edges. The numbers in the right figure give the costs for each
agent that uses these edges.

only edge ei, j (one of the possible paths for a player to reach its sink is to use just the
edge it owns).
Horizontal edges cost 6 + ε and 5 + ε , vertical edges cost 12, 15, and 15 (from left
to right), where ε is a small positive number. We do not refer to ε in the calculations,
but simply state when relevant that the costs of horizontal edges are “more than” 6
and 5, respectively. One motivation for choosing the numbers as we do is shown in
Figure 1, right.
Proof outline Our goal is to show that in a Nash equilibrium all players use the direct
link between their source and their sink. To do this, we will upper bound the number
of players that can be on any horizontal edge. We will tighten this bound gradually,
showing in the end that no player can use any horizontal edge in a Nash Equilibrium,
and thus prove the claim.
A few useful observations follow.
Observation 1 In a Nash equilibrium, all player paths are acyclic; also, the graph
formed by the union of the paths of any pair of players is acyclic as well.
Observation 2 If ei j is used by any player, it is also used by its owner, pi, j .
Proof If this were not true, then the path of any player using ei j together with the
path of pi, j would form a cycle.
⊓
⊔
Definition 1 We call a node a terminal if it has degree 1 in the graph induced by the
union of all the player paths in a Nash equilibrium.
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Observation 3 Consider the graph induced by all the player paths in a Nash equilibrium. (This graph is not necessarily acyclic!) Any (sub)path that leads to a terminal and such that all intermediate nodes have degree 2 is used only by players with
sources and/or sinks on that path. In particular, an edge which leads to a terminal is
used by at most two players: the one whose source is the terminal, and the one whose
sink is the terminal.
Observation 4 Any player that uses a vertical edge ei, j without owning it must also
use at least one horizontal edge in some level i′ ≤ i, and one in some level i′′ ≥ i + 1.
Proof Trivial, since otherwise the player’s path would be contained in a single column of the grid. This, however, can only happen if the player uses the direct edge that
it owns and no other edge.
⊔
⊓
Observation 5 A player with source at level i uses only one edge ei, j , j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Proof The player’s path begins at level i and ends at level i + 1, therefore it needs to
use an odd number of edges ei, j . In order to use three it also needs to use the edge it
owns, in which case it would use no other edge.
⊔
⊓
Players on the left We begin by making sure that players on the left always use the
edge they own (the direct link between their source and sink). To do so, for all levels
i, we substitute ei,1 by a path of three edges êi,1 , êi,2 , êi,3 each of which has cost 4 (and
thus the path of the three edges together has cost 12). Player pi,1 is also substituted by
three players p̂i, j ( j = 1, 2, 3), with p̂i j having as source and sink the lower and upper
endpoints of edge êi, j , respectively. (Player p̂i,1 has node vi,1 as its source and player
p̂i,3 has node vi+1,1 as its sink.) One can now see that the players p̂i, j ( j = 1, 2, 3) will
never deviate from their own edges; each such player would have to share two edges
of cost 4 with only their owners, since its sink and/or its source would be terminals.
Given that these players will never deviate, we will treat them as one player pi,1 ,
and the path êi,1 , êi,2 , êi,3 as the single edge ei,1 , with pi,1 using edge ei,1 in any Nash
Equilibrium.
2.1 The Proof
We will now define two sets of players per level. One can see that the second definition is the symmetric version of the first one.
Definition 2 We define the set Sℓ as the set of all players whose sink lies at some
level k ≤ ℓ, and who use some horizontal edge of some level k′ ≥ ℓ.
Definition 3 We define the set Tℓ as the set of all players whose source lies at some
level k ≥ ℓ, and who use some horizontal edge of some level k′ ≤ ℓ.
Observation 4 implies the following Corollary:
Corollary 1 Consider some level i and some player p with source at level i′ that uses
an edge ei, j , (for some j ∈ {1, 2, 3}) without owning it. If i′ ≤ i, then p ∈ Si+1 , while
if i′ ≥ i, then p ∈ Ti . In particular, if i′ = i then p belongs to Si+1 ∩ Ti .
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We will now fix some set Sℓ and try to bound its size.
Lemma 1 Let i be a level that contains the source of some player in Sℓ . Assume that
i is not the lowest such level.
i. There is a single player in Sℓ with source on level i.
ii. Any player that uses an edge ei, j and does not own it is in Sℓ .
Proof i. i is not the lowest level with a player in Sℓ . Therefore, there is some player
q ∈ Sℓ who must use some edge ei, j to reach level i + 1 and some other edge
ei, j′ , j ∕= j′ to go back down to level i on the way to its sink. This means that
pi, j , pi, j′ ∈
/ Sℓ , since, by Observation 2 they only use the edges they own and no
horizontal edge. Consequently the statement holds.
ii. Suppose there is a player p ∈
/ Sℓ who uses ei, j but does not own it. The source of
p is not on level i; as discussed in i, the three players with sources on i either use
the edges they own, or belong to Sℓ . Let again ei, j , ei, j′ be the two vertical edges
of level i that are used, and let q be some player in Sℓ with source below i.
Case 1: Assume that the source of p is below level i. p must then reach up to
level i + 1, using one of ei, j , ei, j′ , and later return again to i using the other in
order to reach its sink. Notice that these two edges will also be used by player
q ∈ Sℓ . q reaches up to level ℓ while p does not (otherwise it would also use some
horizontal edge at or above ℓ, and thus belong to Sℓ ); this, however, forms a cycle
using the paths of p, q above nodes vi+1, j , vi+1, j′ , a contradiction.
Case 2: Assume that the source of p is above level i. Then also its sink is above
i, meaning that it must return back to i + 1 at some point after reaching i. Thus,
again, it must use both ei, j , ei, j′ . But in that case, we again find a cycle if we combine the paths of p and q (p forms a continuous path linking nodes vi, j , vi, j′ from
below, while q forms a continuous path linking those two nodes from above).
In both cases we reach a contradiction and the statement holds.
⊔
⊓
Lemma 2 ∣Sℓ ∣ ≤ 3. If the lowest level which contains a source of a player in Sℓ only
contains one such source, then ∣Sℓ ∣ ≤ 2.
Proof Let i be the lowest level that contains a source of a player in Sℓ .
Assume first there is a unique player p ∈ Sℓ whose source is on i. Let L p be the set
of levels in the path of p that contain sources of other players that also belong to Sℓ .
p must traverse two edges ek, j for each k ∈ L p , and by Lemma 1, only players in Sℓ
(and the corresponding owners) traverse them. The cost of p for these edges is then
at least (12 + 15)( 31 + 14 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ∣S 1∣+1 ) > 15 if ∣Sℓ ∣ > 2.
ℓ
Assume now that level i contains the sources of two players that belong to Sℓ ,
say p, p′ , and assume that ∣Sℓ ∣ > 3 (and hence i < ℓ − 1). Of course, none of ei,2 , ei,3
is used, while ei,1 is only used by p, p′ and its owner: any other player with source
below (above) i would have to use another edge ei, j , j ∈ {2, 3} to return to level
i (i + 1). Therefore, p, p′ each pay 12/3 = 4 for using ei,1 . Since ℓ > i + 1, they
must continue going upwards until they reach level ℓ and can then return to their
sinks.
( But then, similarly)to the previous case, if ∣Sℓ ∣ > 3 they pay in total 4 + (12 +
15)

1
4

+ 15 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ∣S 1∣+1 > 15.
ℓ

⊔
⊓
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The symmetric version of Lemma 2, gives the corresponding version that bounds
the number of players in Tℓ , for any ℓ > 0.
Lemma 3 ∣Tℓ ∣ ≤ 3. If the highest level which contains a source of a player in Tℓ only
contains one such source, then ∣Tℓ ∣ ≤ 2.
Combining Lemmata 2, 3, we obtain the following bounds on the number of
players on any edge:
Corollary 2 There are at most 6 players on any horizontal edge, and at most 7 on
any vertical edge.
Proof Consider some horizontal edge at some level ℓ. Players that use it either have
sources below ℓ and thus belong to the set Sℓ , or they have sources at or above ℓ, in
which case they belong to Tℓ . Lemmata 2, 3 bound the cardinalities of either of the
sets to at most 3; thus, any horizontal edge of ℓ can be used at most by 6 players.
Similarly, for any eℓ, j , j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, it is enough to note that any player that uses it,
apart from the owner, belongs to at least one of Sℓ+1 , Tℓ (Corollary 1).
⊔
⊓
Now, we can show the following.
Lemma 4 Sℓ does not contain two players whose sources lie at the same level. Therefore, ∣Sℓ ∣ ≤ 2.
Proof Consider the smallest ℓ > 0 such that ∣Sℓ ∣ = 3. Again, let i be the lowest level
that contains sources of players in Sℓ . Level i contains the sources of two players in
Sℓ and hence i < ℓ − 1. Following the lines of the proof of Lemma 2, let p, p′ be these
two players. More specifically, let p be player pi,2 , and p′ be player pi,3 .
Since two players from level i do not use their own edges, they will both use edge
ei,1 to reach level i + 1. They cannot use edge Li+1 since then p would reach its sink
and would not reach up to level ℓ > i + 1. Moreover, Li+1 is not used by any player,
since that would create a cycle with p’s path. Therefore, p, p′ continue on ei+1,1 ,
while they share ei,1 , ei+1,1 only with the corresponding owners. No other player can
use them. Note that only one vertical edge from level i is used. Any player with source
above i using ei+1,1 and necessarily also ei,1 would have no way of returning back to
levels above i without creating a cycle; similarly, a player with source below i would
have no way of returning back to level i. Therefore, p, p′ pay 2 ⋅ 12/3 = 8 for these
two edges.
At some point after using ei+1,1 they also use some other vertical edge to return to level i + 1. That edge cannot be ei+1,1 , therefore they pay at least 15/7 for it
(Corollary 2). Also, after using ei+1,1 , p′ must return to the rightmost column of the
grid, where its source is. Therefore it must use two more horizontal edges (see also
Figure 2). Corollary 2 then implies that it will have to pay more than (6 + 5)/6 for
them.
In total, p′ pays at least 8 + 15/7 + 11/6 > 11.9 just to reach its sink after reaching
node vi1 .
We can now observe that p′ cannot include nodes of level i − 1 in its path: if it
did, it would have to use two more vertical edges (one to reach level i − 1 and another
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Fig. 2 Depicting the path of player p′ for the proof of Lemma 4 along with lower bounds on the cost of
each part. The part from the source vi3 of p′ until node vi+2,1 is fixed.

to return back to i), at most one of which can be of cost 12. Then its total cost would
be more than 11.9 + (12 + 15)/7 > 15.
p′ uses therefore Ri , Li while p can only use Li . Any other player on either of these
edges must belong to Si . However, ℓ is the lowest possible level such that ∣Sℓ ∣ = 3;
thus ∣Si ∣ ≤ 2. p′ pays then more than 5/3 and 6/4 for Ri , Li , respectively, and its total
cost becomes more than 11.9 + 5/3 + 6/4 > 15. This is too expensive, so p′ would
have used its direct edge instead. Therefore ∣Sℓ ∣ ≤ 2 and no two players with sources
at the same level can belong to Sℓ .
⊔
⊓
Again the symmetric version bounds the cardinality of Tℓ .
Lemma 5 Tℓ does not contain two players with sources at the same level. Therefore,
∣Tℓ ∣ ≤ 2.
Combining now Lemmata 4, 5, we can improve the bound given by Corollary 2
for the number of players that can be on any edge. We therefore have the following:
Corollary 3 Any horizontal (vertical) edge is used at most by four (five) players.
Lemma 6 The path of any player spans at most 3 levels.
Proof For the sake of contradiction, consider some player p whose path spans at least
4 levels. Let i be the level of its source. The source and the sink of p are only one
level apart. Therefore, apart from levels i, i + 1, any other level that p reaches implies
that it uses two additional vertical edges: one to reach that level, and one to return.
Also, at most one of these two edges can be of cost 12. Therefore, if it visits at least
k ≥ 4 levels then it must use at least 2(k − 2) + 1 vertical edges in total (with the
“+1” referring to the edge it will use to reach level i + 1 from i). Each of these edges
can be used by at most 5 players in total, according to Corollary 3. Therefore, its
cost for vertical edges only is at least 12(k−2+1)+15(k−2)
. It must also use at least two
5
horizontal edges (otherwise it would have to use its own edge). Again, Corollary 3
implies that its cost for these edges will be at least 2 ⋅ 54 . Now assuming that k ≥ 4, its
total cost is at least 3⋅12+2⋅15
+ 2.5 > 15, implying that p would have used its direct
5
edge instead. Therefore k ≤ 3.
⊔
⊓
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This immediately gives the following Corollary.
Corollary 4 Let p be any player whose source is at level i. p never reaches level
i − 2, or level i + 3.
Lemma 7 There is no level ℓ such that ∣Sℓ ∣ > 0.
Proof Assume that the statement is false. Consider the smallest ℓ such that Sℓ ∕= 0.
/ Let
i be the lowermost level containing the source of some player p, such that p ∈ Sℓ . The
other two players of level i use only the edges they own: the leftmost player always
does so by construction; if the other player used an edge other than the one it owns,
then it would also have to use a horizontal edge in some level i ≥ i + 1. However the
definition of ℓ, p together with Lemma 4 imply that this is not possible.
All players that have source at any level i′ < i use the edges they own: Corollary 1
implies that a player with source at i′ that does not use the edge it owns would belong
to Si′ +1 , with i′ + 1 ≤ i < ℓ. But Si′′ = 0/ for any i′′ < ℓ due to the definition of ℓ.
Consider now again player p. Let ei, j be the vertical edge of level i it is using.
Corollary 1 implies that p ∈ Ti . Any other player p′ that uses edge ei, j without owning
it will belong to Ti as well (remember that no player with source at any level i′ ≤ i
apart form p uses a horizontal edge). Lemma 5 implies that there can be at most one
such player p′ . The source of p′ is higher than level i, meaning that after it reaches i
it needs to return back up. Therefore it uses two of the vertical edges of level i and
apart from the corresponding owners, it shares only one of those with p, while only
one can cost 12, see also Figure 3 (left). This already costs at least 12/2 + 15/3 = 11.
Of course p′ must use also one edge connecting the level of its source with that of its
sink, which will cost at least 12/5 (Corollary 3). Finally, it needs to use at least one
horizontal edge of level i or below which can be shared with at most one more player
(i.e., p), at cost at least 5/2. In total, this sums up to 11 + 2.4 + 2.5 > 15. Therefore,
no player is in Ti together with p, and p shares ei, j only with its owner.
This implies that p does not reach level i − 1. If it did, it would have to use at
least two more vertical edges (first to reach level i − 1 and then to leave it again), but
given that it is the only player in Ti , it would only share the costs with their owners.
That would immediately imply cost more than 2 ⋅ 12/2 + 15/2 > 15. Similarly, p
does not reach level i + 2; its cost this time would be more than 12/2 + (12 + 15)/5 +
5 (for a horizontal edge of level i) > 15.
Hence, p only uses horizontal edges of levels i, i + 1, and a single vertical edge
ei, j , for some j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Also, ℓ = i + 1. Let us consider some horizontal edge of
level i + 1 that p uses. Any other player on it will belong either to Si+1 , or to Ti+1 .
Si+1 consists, however, only of p. Note also that if there is only one player in Ti+1
then p would have used its direct edge instead: If If p uses L1 , then its cost would be
more than 6 + 12/2 + 6/2 = 15. If p uses Ri (and not Li ), then the vertical edge p uses
is of total cost 15, implying it would pay more than 5 + 15/2 + 5/2 = 15. Therefore,
there must be two players in Ti+1 . Lemma 5 and Corollary 4 imply that one of these
players must have source at level i + 1, and the other at i + 2. Let q be the player with
source at level i + 1, and q′ the one with source at i + 2, see also Figure 3 (right).
q only uses one vertical edge of level i + 1, while q′ must use two. One of these
two edges will be shared with q. The other one will only be shared with the owner:
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Fig. 3 Possible paths of players in the proof of Lemma 7. Left: A possible path for player p′ along with
lower bounds on the cost of (some of) the edges it must use. The solid lines indicate edges that would be
used both by p and p′ . The dotted (dashed) line completes the path of p (p′ ), along with the solid line.
Right: Possible paths of p,q,q′ . The solid, dotted, dashed lines correspond to the path of player p,q,q′ ,
respectively.

any other player that uses it without being the owner must belong to Ti+1 which only
consists of q, q′ . Of course q′ also needs to use some vertical edge connecting level
i + 2 to level i + 3 (at cost at least 12/5); it also needs to use at least one horizontal
edge of level i + 1 (possibly) sharing only with p, q (at cost more than 5/3), as well
as some horizontal edge at level i + 3 or above (at cost more than 5/4), see also
Figure 3 (right). Therefore, its total cost is more than 12/2 + 15/3 + 12/5 + 5/3 +
5/4 > 15. Hence, q′ would have used its direct edge.
This implies that Ti+1 consists of a single player, causing also p to use its direct
edge, and therefore Sℓ = 0.
/
⊔
⊓
Theorem 1 The Price of Stability in undirected networks is at least 42/23 > 1.826.
Proof If a player with source at level i does not use the edge it owns, then Si+1 ∕= 0.
/
Lemma 7 states that this is not possible. Therefore, there is a unique Nash Equilibrium, in which every player uses its own edge.
On every level, the total cost of the players in the Nash equilibrium is 12 + 15 +
15 = 42, whereas the optimal cost is only 12 + 6 + 5 = 23. The optimal solution has an
additional cost of 11 for the two horizontal edges on level 1, but this cost is negligible
for large K.
⊔
⊓
3 Two and Three Players
We will describe here a lower and an upper bound for three players, as well as an
unconditional upper bound for two players.
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Lower bound for three players Figure 4 shows a three-player instance where the
best Nash equilibrium has cost 37/24 times that of OPT. Node si ,ti is the source,
destination, respectively of player i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The optimal solution would only use
the edges (s1 , s2 ), (s2 , s3 ), (s3 ,t1 ), (t1 ,t2 ), while the Nash solution uses the direct edges
(s1 ,t1 ), (s2 ,t2 ), (s3 ,t3 ). The cost of the optimal solution sums then up to 48 + 4ε ,
while the Nash Equilibrium solution has cost 74. We have therefore the following
theorem.
24
26

8+ǫ

s1

14 + ǫ

s2

18 + ǫ

s3

8+ǫ

t1

t2 = t3

15 + ǫ
24
Fig. 4 A three-player instance with price of stability more than 1.54.

Theorem 2 In the fair cost sharing network design game with three players, the price
of stability is at least 74/48 ≈ 1.5417.
Proof Let p1 , p2 , p3 be the three players (with pi having to connect si to ti ). It is
clear that a solution of value 48 + 4ε exists. We will show that there is no other Nash
Equilibrium besides the one mentioned above of cost 74, i.e., every player pi uses
edge (si ,ti ). Note first that edge (s2 , s3 ) cannot be used by both players p2 and p3
(since their paths would create a cycle, given that they both have to reach t2 ).
First, we will show that player p1 must use (only) the edge (s1 ,t1 ). Assume that
p1 does not use the direct edge (s1 ,t1 ) (and also no other player is using it, as this
would create a cycle with p1 ).
– Assume first that p1 is using edge (s1 , s2 ). p1 must then use either edge (s2 ,t2 ) or
(s2 , s3 ).
p1 uses (s2 ,t2 ) Then it must also use (t1 ,t3 ). p2 will also then be on (s2 ,t2 ) (and
will not be using any other edge). If p3 is on (s2 ,t2 ) as well, then p1 must be alone
on (s1 , s2 ) and (t1 ,t2 ), implying a total cost for p1 equal to 8 + ε + 24
3 +8+ε =
24 + 2ε > 24 so p1 would have preferred to use the direct edge (s1 ,t1 ) instead.
If p3 is not on (s2 ,t2 ), then it is also not on (s1 , s2 ) (otherwise there would be a
8+ε
cycle with p2 ). p1 ’s cost would then be 8 + ε + 24
2 + 2 > 24. So p1 again would
prefer (s1 ,t1 ).
p1 uses (s2 , s3 ) No player uses (s1 , s3 ) (since that would create a cycle with p1 ),
and since (s1 ,t1 ) is also not in use, p1 is alone on (s1 , s2 ). Moreover, at most one
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ε
of p2 , p3 can be on (s2 , s3 ). Then p1 pays at least 8 + ε + 14+
2 > 15 + ε in order
to reach s3 . Therefore it would have used edge (s1 ,t1 ) instead.
Therefore p1 is not on (s1 ,t1 ).
– Suppose p1 is on (s1 , s3 ). Then it has to use either(s2 , s3 ) or (s3 ,t1 ).

p1 uses (s2 , s3 ) Then it must also use (s2 ,t2 ) (implying that p2 is only using
(s2 ,t2 )) and (t1 ,t2 ). Even if player p3 was on all edges p1 uses, its total cost
ε +8ε
would still be at least 15+ε +14+
+ 24
2
3 > 24, so p1 would have preferred edge
(s1 ,t1 ) instead.
p1 uses (s3 ,t1 ) Consider then player p2 . Assume that p2 is not using the direct
edge (s2 ,t2 ). Given that (s1 ,t1 ) is not used, p2 has only two options: Either it uses
(s1 , s2 ) and (s1 , s3 ), or it uses (s2 , s3 ).
If p2 is on (s1 , s2 ) and (s1 , s3 ), player p3 cannot have used (s1 , s2 ) without creating
a cycle either in its own path or with p2 (remember that edge (s1 ,t1 ) is not in
ε
18+ε
8+ε
use). Therefore the cost of p2 would be at least 8 + ε + 15+
2 + 3 + 2 > 24,
implying that p2 would have used the direct edge (s2 ,t2 ) instead.
If p2 is on (s2 , s3 ) then p3 cannot be using it. Therefore, p2 pays at least 14 + ε +
18+ε
8+ε
3 + 2 > 24.
Thus, p2 will be using (s2 ,t2 ).
Given now that p2 is only using (s2 ,t2 ) and the fact that p3 cannot be both on
ε
(s1 , s3 ) and (s3 ,t1 ), the cost of p is at least 15 + ε + 18+
2 > 24 (if p3 is not on
ε
(s1 , s3 )), or 15+
2 + 18 + ε > 24 (if p3 is not on (s3 ,t1 )).
In all cases, p1 would therefore prefer to use the direct edge (s1 ,t1 ).
We next consider player p2 . Assume that p2 is not using the direct edge (s2 ,t2 )
(and thus p3 cannot use it either). p2 will not use (s2 , s3 ), since its cost will then be at
least 14 + ε + 26
2 > 24.
Therefore, p2 uses edge (s1 , s2 ) and afterwards it either uses (s1 , s3 ) or (s1 ,t1 ).
– Assume p2 uses (s1 , s3 ). In this case p3 cannot be in either of (s1 , s3 ) or (s1 , s2 ),
as this would create a cycle (either in its own path, or together with p2 ). p2 would
then have to pay at least 8 + ε + 15 + ε + 26
2 > 24.
– Assume p2 uses (s1 ,t1 ). Consider player p3 . Assume that p3 is not using the direct
edge (s3 ,t2 ), or (s3 ,t1 ) and then (t1 ,t2 ).
Since (s2 ,t2 ) is not used by any player, p3 must be using (s1 ,t1 ) with direction
from s1 to t1 (just as p2 does). The cheapest way that p3 has to reach node s1
though is via edge (s1 , s3 ). Therefore p3 would pay in total at least 15 + ε + 24
3 +
8+ε
>
26,
so
it
would
rather
use
the
direct
edge
(s
,t
)
instead.
Therefore
p3
3
2
2
is either on (s3 ,t2 ), or (s3 ,t1 ) and (t1 ,t2 ). As a result, the cost of p2 is at least
8+ε
8 + ε + 24
2 + 2 > 24.
Thus, also p2 uses the direct edge (s2 ,t2 ). Now player p3 would not use edge (s2 ,t2 )
since it would require a total cost of at least 14 + ε + 24
2 > 26. It cannot then reach
node s2 as this would create a cycle with p2 . If it uses (s1 , s3 ) it must also use (s1 ,t1 ),
and pay at least 15 + ε + 24
2 + 8 > 26. Edge (s3 ,t2 ) results in a lower cost than using
both (s3 ,t1 ) and (t1 ,t2 ), and thus p3 also using the direct edge (s3 ,t2 ).
The above imply that the Nash Equilibrium is unique.
⊔
⊓
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Upper bound for three players Given an instance of our problem, let OPT refer to
an optimal solution. We refer to the union of the players’ paths at OPT as the OPT
graph. Recall that our game is a potential game, with potential function Φ (X) =
∑e∈E ce H(Xe ) where ce is the cost of edge e, H(x) is the xth harmonic number, X is
a game state or solution, and Xe is the number of players on edge e in X. Let N be
a potential minimizing Nash solution (or, alternatively, N can be defined as a Nash
solution reached by starting from OPT and making alternating best-response moves).
Hence, we have
Φ (N) ≤ Φ (OPT ).
(1)
We now give names for various sets of edges, each of which may or may not
be empty. Let A, B, and C be the sets of edges that player 1, player 2, and player 3
(respectively) use alone in N. Let Si j for i = 1 . . . 2 and j = i + 1 . . . 3 be the set of
edges that players i and j alone share in N. Let S123 be the set of edges that all three
∗ , S∗ , S∗ and S∗
players share in N. Let A∗ , B∗ ,C∗ , S12
13 23
123 be defined analogously for
OPT. We will also use the same names to refer to the total cost of the edges in each
set.
Let C(X) refer to the cost of the solution X and let Ci (X) refer to the cost just to
player i of the solution X. By definition, we have
C(N) = A + B + C + S12 + S23 + S13 + S123
∗
∗
∗
∗
+ S123
+ S13
C(OPT ) = A∗ + B∗ + C∗ + S12
+ S23
S12 S13 S123
C1 (N) = A +
+
+
2
2
3
S12 S23 S123
C2 (N) = B +
+
+
2
2
3
S13 S23 S123
C3 (N) = C +
+
+
2
2
3
∗ > 0 or not.
Lemmas 8,9 show how to bound the PoS depending on whether S123

Lemma 8 In the fair cost sharing network design game with three players, if all
three players share at least one edge of positive cost in the optimal solution, the price
of stability is at most 33/20 = 1.65.
∗
Proof First observe that the edges in the set S123
must form a contiguous path, that
is, once the three players’ paths in the OPT graph merge, as soon as one player’s path
breaks off, the three may never merge again. (Otherwise the OPT graph would have a
cycle, contradicting the fact that it is an optimal solution.) Without loss of generality,
we can exchange the labels on the endpoint vertices so that the three endpoints on the
∗ are all source endpoints, and the three endpoints on the
same side of the edges in S123
other side are all destination endpoints.
∗ , S∗ , and S∗ must be empty. Otherwise the
Then observe that at least one of S12
23
13
OPT graph would have a cycle, contradicting the definition of OPT. Without loss of
∗ is empty, hence S∗ = 0 and C(OPT ) = A∗ + B∗ +C∗ +
generality, we assume that S13
13
∗
∗
∗
S12 + S23 + S123.
We know by definition of N that each player i pays not more at N than by unilaterally defecting to any alternate si − ti connection path. The right hand sides of
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each of the following inequalities represents an upper bound on the cost of a feasible
alternate si − ti path for each player i. The existence of these alternate paths depends
∗ = 0.
on the assumption that the OPT graph is connected and S13
B S12 S23
+
+
2
2
3
A S12 S13
∗
∗
∗
C2 (N) ≤ B + A + S23 + +
+
2
2
3
C S23 S13
∗
∗
∗
C2 (N) ≤ B + C + S12 + +
+
2
2
3
B S23 S12
∗
∗
∗
+
C3 (N) ≤ C + B + S12 + +
2
2
3
∗
C1 (N) ≤ A∗ + B∗ + S23
+

S123
3
S123
+
3
S123
+
3
S123
+
3
+

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

To interpret the above inequalities intuitively, consider for example the first inequality. It states the fact that player 1 pays an amount at Nash that is at most the
cost of unilaterally deviating and instead taking the path in the OPT graph from s1
∗
to s2 where player 2’s OPT path begins (possibly using edges from A∗ , B∗ , and S23
),
then following along player 2’s path in N from s2 to t2 (using edges from B, S12 , S23 ,
and S123 ), then taking edges in the OPT graph from t2 to t1 (again possibly using
∗ ). The costs of S∗ and S∗ need not be included in the
edges from A∗ , B∗ , and S23
12
123
right-hand side of the first inequality for the following reasoning. Recall that by as∗ and sink vertices are
sumption, source vertices are on one side of the edges in S123
∗
∗ is not necessary
on the other side of the edges in S123 , so traversing any edges in S123
for player 1 to go from s1 to s2 or from t2 to t1 in the OPT graph. Also note that the
∗
∗
edges in S12
must be adjacent to the contiguous path formed by edges in S123
(since
otherwise, the OPT graph would contain a cycle), and so in fact, s1 and s2 are on one
∗ ∪ S∗ , while t and t are on the other.
side of S12
1
2
123

Fig. 5 A sample OPT graph. Each edge is labeled with the name of the set of edges it belongs to. Each
edge here may represent a sequence of edges forming a path. Note that more generally, any of the sets A∗ ,
∗ , S∗ , and S∗ could be empty.
B∗ , C∗ , S12
23
13
∗ = 0, we can say
From inequality (1) and the assumption that S13

3
11
3 ∗
11 ∗
∗
A + B + C + (S12 + S13 + S23) + S123 ≤ A∗ + B∗ + C∗ + (S12
+ S23
) + S123
.
2
6
2
6
(6)
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Scaling the inequalities 2 and 5 each by 10/99, 3 and 4 each by 8/99, and 6 by
6/11, then summing all five resulting inequalities yields
20
257
245
(A + B + C) +
S13 +
(S12 + S23) + S123
33
297
297
8
10
∗
∗
∗
≤ (A∗ + C∗ ) + B∗ + S12
+ S23
+ S123
.
11
11
Hence 20/33C(N) ≤ C(OPT ).

(7)

⊔
⊓

Lemma 9 In the fair cost sharing network design game with three players, if no
positive-cost edge is shared by all three players in the optimal solution, the price of
stability is at most 3/2.
We are now ready to present our main theorem of this section.
Theorem 3 In the fair cost sharing network design game with three players, the price
of stability is at most 33/20 = 1.65.
Proof All possible OPT graph structures are handled by Lemmas 9 and 8. The worst
upper bound for price of stability over these two exhaustive cases is that given by
Lemma 8.
⊔
⊓
Upper bound for two players Anshelevich et al. [2] gave a two player lower bound
instance for our problem showing that the price of stability is at least 4/3. They
then show that if both players share a sink, the price of stability is at most 4/3. The
following theorem, which is proven in an analogous manner to Theorem 3, states an
unconditional two-player upper bound on the price of stability of 4/3.
Theorem 4 In the fair cost sharing network design game with two players, price of
stability is at most 4/3.

4 Conclusions
The lower bound instance that we use for large n could be generalized by adding more
columns. However, it seems that this would require a significantly longer and more
involved proof. More importantly, we believe that even with an unbounded number of
columns we could only show a lower bound of a small constant. Hence, the question
of whether the price of stability grows with n remains open. We conjecture that it is
in fact constant.
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